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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
 
 For the purposes of this reply brief, we will address the issues as follows: 
 1. The citation did not charge a crime and the “amended” complaint, which 
charged a different crime, was filed after the statute of limitations had run. Should the  
charges have been dismissed? 
 2.  What is a “stalker?” Both lower courts erred in their definition of 
“stalking” and in fact disagreed as to the definition of malicious intent as it was applied 
in this case. Because of this disagreement, there is a clear ambiguity in the wording of 
the statute that even judges could not agree upon. In such cases, the court should apply 
the Rule of Lenity and dismiss the charge.  
 3. The state makes its entire argument of whether the trial court had 
sufficient substantial and credible evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt upon the fact the “record was incomplete.” Should this Court consider 




 This reply brief is divided into three parts: The first part discusses the denial of 
the Defendant’s motion for dismissal based on the statute of limitations; the second part 
relates to the misinterpretation of the charged statute by the magistrate and district 
courts in defining the required intent of “malice;” and third part addresses the 
sufficiency of the record argument propounded by the State.  
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 2 
 
PART I. 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE NEW AND ADDITIONAL 
OFFENSE THAT WAS FILED BY THE STATE AFTER THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS HAD RUN. 
 
 Standard of Review 
 
 The applicability of a statute of limitations to an action under a given set of facts 
is a question of law over which the appellate courts exercise free review. State v. O'Neill, 
118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990). Whether a charging document conforms 
to the requirements of law is a question subject to free review. State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 
105St6, 1057, 772 P.2d 263, 264 (Ct.App.1989); State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 287, 
805 P.2d 491, 493 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 926, 935 P.2d 183, 189 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
 The Citation and the Amended Complaint Did Not Charge the Same Crime. 
  There is no dispute that the state charged Dean by Uniform Citation with two 
counts of second degree stalking, both of which were alleged to have been committed 
on the same date and time, in violation of I.C. § "18-7906(c)(4)." (R., p.8.); AG Brief at 
10. There is no dispute that the citation claimed these two acts as crimes. 
 The State argues that “even a cursory review of the citation and the Amended 
Complaint shows they charged the same offense — second degree stalking — the second 
degree stalking charge alleged in the Amended Complaint was merely a continuation of 
the prosecution initiated by the filing of the Uniform Citation and, as such, was not 
time-barred.” Id. It appears the State concedes that the other charge alleged in the 
amended complaint (“unlawful entry”) “failed as a matter of law” because the express 
language of the applicable statute excepts prosecution against a landlord (as the 
magistrate found). The State however also concedes that the unlawful entry charge was 
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dismissed “on statute of limitations grounds.” AG Brief at 4, citing (R., pp.48-50, 53-
56.). The basis for both charges was the same. The unlawful entry was dismissed on 
statute of limitations grounds. 
 The Citation Was Not Sufficient to Ensure Due Process 
 A charging document must be sufficient to fairly inform the defendant of the 
charges against him. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 805 P.2d 491; Summer, 139 Idaho 219, 
221–22, 76 P.3d 963, 965–66; State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 
(Ct.App.1995). A charging document must be specific enough to advise a defendant as 
to the particular section of the statute he or she is being charged with having violated. 
State v. Grady, at 211, 404 P.2d at 351. Owen at 926, at 189. 
 A charging document is legally sufficient if it satisfies two requirements: “‘it must 
impart jurisdiction” and it must “‘satisfy due process."’ State v.  Schmierer, 159 Idaho 
768, _, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016) (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 695, 708, 215 
P.3d 414, 428 (2009)).  
 This Court significantly modified the jurisdictional analysis by clearly 
differentiating between due process and jurisdictional queries. In State v. Jones, 140 
Idaho 755, 101 P.3d 699, the defendant asserted that the information filed against him 
was jurisdictionally deficient because it did not allege all the elements of the referenced 
crime and therefore failed to charge an offense. The Court noted that when considering 
the legal sufficiency of a charging document, “[t]here are two standards to consider.” 
Id. at 758, 101 P.3d at 702. The first is whether the document is sufficient for the 
purpose of due process and the second is whether it is sufficient to impart jurisdiction. 
Id.  
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 Addressing due process first, the Court stated, “There are a host of due process 
requirements that must be met by a charging document, such as factual specificity 
adequate to ‘enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended’ and 
to shield against double jeopardy.” Id. (quoting State v. Grady, 89 Idaho 204, 208–09, 
404 P.2d 347, 349–50 (1965)). To satisfy due process, a charging document must 
ordinarily be specific enough to ensure that the defendant has a meaningful opportunity 
to prepare his defense. Severson, 147 Idaho at 709, 215 P.3d at 429 (citations omitted). 
 The State argues that a uniform citation satisfies due process notice requirements 
if it contains a brief description of the offense, the applicable code section, and the date 
and time it was alleged to have been committed. AG Brief at 12. These elements were 
not met. The findings of the trial court indicate that that court considered an entire 
pattern of conduct beginning much earlier than the date given, and involving more 
than simply “entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased or occupied by the 
victim,” as the State urged in its brief (“that is precisely the conduct that formed the 
basis of the second degree stalking charge alleged in the Amended Complaint.” AG Brief 
at 13). It cannot be the basis for the stalking charge that Mr. Dean, the landlord, entered 
the common area of his own property, regardless of whether it was “occupied” by the 
alleged victim. 
 The State Incorrectly Urges this Court to Apply the “Liberal Standard” 
 The State also seems to urge that the burden to request a more definite statement 
somehow shifted to the Defendant within the first 28 days after the charge is filed 
(“Because Dean did not even attempt to avail himself of that remedy, his motion to 
dismiss the citation on the alleged basis that it failed to provide him with adequate 
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notice of the charged offenses was not well-taken.” AG Brief at 12, n.2).  This is contrary 
to the state of the law. 
 Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b) provides in part: 
The following must be raised prior to trial:  
* * * * * * 
(2) Defenses and objections based on defects in the complaint, indictment 
or information (other than it fails to show jurisdiction of the court or to 
charge an offense which objection shall be noticed by the court at any 
time during the pendency of the proceedings). 
 
State v. Cahoon, 116 Idaho 399, 400, 775 P.2d 1241, 1242 (1989)(emphasis added). 
 
 The Court noted that “[t]his provision would appear to allow counsel to keep 
silent about a document's failure ‘to charge an offense’ until after trial.” Id. Cahoon 
stands for the premise that after trial, a more severe burden on the Defendant attaches: 
“A tardily challenged charging document will be upheld, the Court said, “unless it is so 
defective that it does not, by any fair or reasonable construction, charge an offense for 
which the defendant is convicted.” Id. 
 This greater burden on the Defendant only applies when it is not raised prior to 
trial. If an alleged deficiency is raised by a defendant before trial or entry of a guilty 
plea, the charging document must state all facts essential to establish the charged 
offense, State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 168, 75 P.3d 219, 222 (Ct.App.2003); 
Byington, 135 Idaho at 623, 21 P.3d at 945. Only if the information is not challenged 
until after a verdict or guilty plea, will it “be liberally construed in favor of validity, 
and a technical deficiency that does not prejudice the defendant will not provide a basis 
to set the conviction aside.” Halbesleben, 139 Idaho at 168, 75 P.3d at 222; Cahoon, 116 
Idaho at 400, 775 P.2d at 1242; Robran, 119 Idaho at 287, 805 P.2d at 493; State v. 
McNair, 141 Idaho 263, 268, 108 P.3d 410, 415 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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 Thus, in this case, the standard to be applied is “the charging document must 
state all facts essential to establish the charged offense.” Halbesleben, supra, 139 Idaho 
at 168, 75 P.3d at 222; Byington, supra, 135 Idaho at 623, 21 P.3d at 945. 
 There is a distinction between a failure to allege an element of the offense or a 
material fact—which may be later proven, admitted to, or inferred from the language in 
the document and the cited statute—establishing what is actually a crime, and alleging 
acts that do not constitute a crime according to the laws of the State. State v. Olin, 
153 Idaho 891, 894, 292 P.3d 282, 285 (Ct. App. 2012). Olin is instructive in this case. 
The Court noted that Olin, by guilty plea, admitted to all of the facts alleged in the 
amended indictment and, and even still, the acts did not amount to a crime under the 
applicable law. Olin, 153 Idaho at 895, 292 P.3d at 286. In this case, Dean could have 
“entered or remained on property owned, leased or occupied by the victim” without 
committing the crime of stalking, and even if he admitted all of the facts alleged in the 
citation, he would not have committed a crime. 
 The State urges that merely mentioning the statute and common name of the 
violation is sufficient to put the Defendant on notice. But a review of the case law shows 
this only applies under the “liberal standard” which applies only if the Defendant’s 
motion was made after a verdict or guilty plea.  “[W]e hold that when an objection to a 
charging document is not made until after the entry of judgment, if the applicable code 
section is named in the charging document its language may be read into the text of the 
charge.” Jones at 759, 101 P.3d at 703. In essence, the State is urging this Court to extend 
the liberal standard to instant case, even though the challenge to the citation in this 
case was undeniably made prior to trial and thus the liberal standard is not applicable. 
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 Even a cursory review of the trial court’s findings indicates that his finding of 
guilt was based on conduct far beyond the mere entering onto premises occupied by 
the accuser in this case. Perhaps this explains why the District Court refused to uphold 
the case on both the statute of limitations finding, and the findings concerning the 
conduct of the Defendant alleged beyond the non-consensual entry of the premises. 
 Thus, the citation did not charge a crime, the amendment charged a new crime, 
and did so after the statute of limitations had run. The charges should now be 
dismissed. 
PART II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT MISINTERPRETED THE ELEMENT  
OF MALICE TO INCLUDE INTENDING “CIVIL INJURIES.” 
 
 Standard of Review 
 When the district court renders an opinion in its intermediate appellate 
capacity, we directly review the district court’s opinion. The interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Bonner 
Cty. v. Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291, 294, 323 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Ct. App. 
2014)(citations omitted). 
 What is stalking? 
 The appellee chose not to address the heart of the second issue. This was 
not a sufficiency of evidence argument. Sufficiency of evidence analysis asks 
“Did the State prove the element beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
acted maliciously?” In this case, the Appellant is asking this Court to consider a 
statutory interpretation analysis which asks, “Did the Defendant meet the 
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statutory definition of acting maliciously?” 
 Even if we take every accusation made by the “victim” in this case as true, 
do these facts arise to an act of stalking? If we completely set aside the credibility 
question, are the alleged, or even accepted facts, sufficient to find malice as a 
matter of law? 
 We will first agree that even though there is a disagreement between the 
trial court and the district court as to how they found that malice was involved 
in this case, this Court must consider only whether the District Court 
interpretation of the statute, including the statutory definition of “malice,” was 
correct. If not, then as a minimum, this matter must be returned to the District 
Court, hopefully with some helpful direction as to the true analysis of the 
statutory definition of malice. 
 Both courts are hard pressed to find that the actions of the Defendant, even 
taken in the best light to the facts set forth by his accuser, showed that the 
Defendant was acting maliciously. 
 What is stalking? 
 By defining that the offense of stalking will only be found when the 
perpetrator acts both “knowingly” and “maliciously” the legislature delineated 
actions taken with an evil intent, not simply those that are “annoying” or 
“offensive.” This is important, because the statute could otherwise prohibit 
innocent activities simply because someone arbitrarily found the to be offensive 
or annoying. The real question in delineating stalking from other forms of 
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offensive or intrusive behavior is “what is the actor’s intent?” 
 The Law from Other States Helps Define the Common Understanding of 
the Malice Involved with Stalking 
 
 The majority of states have required that stalking activity include 
“assaultive behavior” or “harassment.” 
 The Indiana Supreme court for example found that a person who parked 
on a public street and attempted to peer into the windows of homes with a pair 
of binoculars was not committing the act of stalking.  The Court found that while 
they did “not mean to suggest that no circumstances exist in which only public 
sightings may constitute harassment or impermissible contact” in that case 
nothing occurred that would remotely indicate to [the Defendant] that his 
conduct was impermissible. The fact that [the Defendant] was looking in the 
direction of [the accuser’s] house with binoculars fell more within the ambit of 
voyeurism, not stalking. VanHorn v. State, 889 N.E.2d 908, 913–14 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2008). Thus, voyeurism was offensive conduct and an invasion of privacy, but it 
did not constitute stalking. Likewise, in this case, the touching of intimate 
apparel left in a common area open to the landlord may be invasive or offensive, 
but it is not “harassment.” Nothing in this case occurred that would have 
remotely indicated that his conduct was impermissible. 
 There is no “bright line” offensiveness to the alleged activities of the 
appellant in the outer bathroom which by all accounts his accuser did not lease. 
Even if he touched the “intimate apparel” which she left of the bathroom floor 
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on numerous occasions (even with a laundry basket a few feet away), there 
would be no obvious indications that the conduct truly alarmed her. A 
reasonable reaction of an alarmed person would have been to have taken steps 
to keep her intimate apparel somewhere else more private. The fact that she did 
not, argues against the notion that he was indeed causing his accuser alarm. 
Thus, he could not have been acting maliciously, because there was no reason to 
believe her privacy was being invaded when she left her clothing in a common 
area to which the landlord unquestionably had access.  
 The Alaska Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue. While first 
explaining:  
“A statute is unconstitutionally vague if its wording is so imprecise 
“that people of common intelligence would be relegated to differing 
guesses about its meaning. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 632, 111 
S.Ct. 2491, 2497, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991). Such a statute offends 
constitutional values in two major ways: by failing to give people 
“adequate notice of the conduct that is prohibited”, and by placing 
a power of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement in the hands of 
police, prosecutors, and ultimately judges and juries.  
 
 Petersen v. State, 930 P.2d 414, 424 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)(citation omitted). 
 
 The court then went on to analyze that state’s stalking statute: 
 
Nevertheless, the crime of stalking requires proof of more than 
repeated acts of nonconsensual contact. Under AS 11.41.270(a), the 
State must prove (1) that the defendant “knowingly” engaged in 
repeated acts of nonconsensual contact, (2) that the defendant's 
conduct placed another person in fear of injury or death (or in fear 
of the injury or death of a “family member” as defined in AS 
11.41.270(b)(2)), and (3) that the defendant acted “recklessly” with 
regard to this result.  
 
Petersen v. State, 930 P.2d 414, 425 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).  
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We conclude that Alaska's stalking statutes are constitutional 
because, in essence, they outlaw assaultive conduct.  
 
Id., 930 P.2d at 431. 
 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that 
citizens be afforded “a fair warning of proscribed conduct.” City of Spokane v. 
Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). A statute is 
unconstitutionally vague if it either (1) fails to sufficiently define the offense so 
that people of “common intelligence” can understand what conduct is 
proscribed, or (2) fails to provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect 
against arbitrary enforcement. Id. 
 The two judges of the case differed in their analysis. The State argued a 
different theory than that adopted by either of the judges. This undeniably shows 
that people of “common intelligence” differed on how or why this conduct was 
proscribed. As a result, Mr. Dean was adjudged guilty with an arbitrary definition 
of malice. 
 The Utah appellate court found no stalking in conduct unless it was 
“directed at causing physical harm or emotional distress to an intended person.” 
Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Additionally, 
they found that the emotional distress element is not satisfied by causing mere 
anxiety or annoyance. That state’s Supreme Court found that reasonable 
“emotional distress” required conduct that is “outrageous and intolerable in that 
it offends the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.” Russell v. 
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Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992).  
 Most states require that the conduct rise at least to the level of harassment. 
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506 (Unless otherwise provided by law, a person 
commits the crime of stalking if, with intent to harass another person, the person 
engages in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass that person); § 
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (The definition of stalking requires that a person “willfully, 
maliciously, and repeatedly follow, harass, or cyberstalk another person.”  
 Massachusetts requires that the offender willfully and maliciously engage 
in a knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of time directed at 
a specific person which seriously alarms or annoys that person and would cause 
a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and make a threat 
with the intent to place the person in imminent fear of death or bodily injury. 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 43. 
 The Delaware Supreme Court found the Delaware stalking statute was 
unconstitutionally vague. That statute punished “[a]ny person who wilfully, 
maliciously and repeatedly follows or harasses another person....” 11 Del.C. § 
1312A(a) Snowden v. State, 677 A.2d 33, 36 (Del. 1996). This statute went beyond 
the requirements of Idaho’s statute. 
  In order for the Idaho statute to pass constitutional scrutiny, the 
prohibited activity must be more than an “I know it when I see it approach.” 
Thus, there must be more to the requirement of malice than simple 
offensiveness. The conduct must be directed at the victim, not simply affect her. 
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In order to meet the level of malice, the conduct must be either assaultive, or 
constitute the common understanding of harassment. Otherwise, the public has 
no common understanding of stalking, or of what conduct the state seeks to 
prohibit. 
 The fact that the Defendant in this case has not even been accused of such 
assaultive or harassment behavior explains why the District Court refused to 
follow the trial court’s interpretation of malicious intent. 
 The District Court’s Erred in Interpreting the Definition of Malice to 
Include “Civil Injuries.” 
 
 But we need not concern ourselves with the wide disparity in definitions 
of the elements of stalking. In this case, the question is simple. Did the district 
court in its intermediate appellate capacity get it right when it concluded that 
“breach of contract” or some other civil “injury” was enough to fulfill the 
definition of malice under the Idaho criminal stalking law?  
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court succinctly declared: 
 
 “It is axiomatic, however, that a criminal “defendant cannot be 
convicted unless his conduct, or conduct for which he is legally 
responsible, was such as to meet the requirements of criminal and 
not tort law.”  
 
Commonwealth v. Stafford, 451 Pa. 95, 301 A.2d 600, 602 (1973). 
 This Court cannot uphold the definition of malice as applied by the 
District Court in this case. Noone in this state has ever been placed on 
notice that civil torts might expose them to prosecution as a stalker. 
 With the judges and other officers of the court showing confusion 
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over how to apply Idaho’s stalking statute to this case, it becomes clear that 
the wording of the statute is vague as it is being applied. The courts are 
thus “obligated to apply the doctrine of lenity, which requires courts to 
construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the accused.” State v. 
Wees, 138 Idaho 119, 124, 58 P.3d 103, 108 (Ct.App.2002); State v. Dewey, 
131 Idaho 846, 848, 965 P.2d 206, 208 (Ct.App.1998); McNair, 141 Idaho 
at 266, 108 P.3d at 413 (Ct. App. 2005).  
 Thus, the duty of this Court becomes clear. It must reverse and 
vacate the appellant’s conviction. In the alternative, it must reject the 
district court’s mistaken interpretation of the statute, and remand this case 
for further proceedings.  
PART III. 
THE RECORD IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
FINDING THAT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A FINDING OF GUILT 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. ANY OBJECTION TO THE STATE OF THE 
APPELLATE RECORD SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED BY THE STATE AT THE 
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE LEVEL. 
 
 The appellee in this case has determined to place its argument on the fact 
that there was an incomplete appellate record. This is the same record that was 
put forth before the District Court in its intermediate appellate role, and the State 
nonetheless found the record sufficient to make its arguments. The State did not 
protest the state of the appellate record at the district court level. If this Court 
adopts the Appellee’s position, we argue that it would require that the Court find 
that the District Court erred in allowing the partial transcript and therefore this 
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matter should be remanded to correct that error.  
 The Appellant believes our arguments stand against the decision put forth 
by the District Court, which as explained in our initial brief, was clearly 
erroneous, in that the findings of the trial court were not supported by credible 
and substantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Conclusion 
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Appellant requests that the Judgment 
of Conviction be Vacated and the charge dismissed. In the alternative, the Defendant 
requests that the Judgment of Conviction be vacated and the case remanded back to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with the guidance of the Court. 
 
 
